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BUSINESS AssOCIATIONS-UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr-CORPORA-
TION AS A LIMITED PARTNER-The Port Arthur Trust Co., a Texas corpora-
tion, sought to enter into a limited partnership agreement as a limited part-
ner. Its capital contribution was to be three trusts established by the prospec-
tive general partner wherein the trust company had been named trustee. The 
secretary of state refused to file the instrument creating the limited partner-
ship on the grounds "that it was necessary for a corporation to have express 
charter powers" before it can, enter into a limited partnership, and that 
"a corporation is not a 'person' " 1 within the meaning of the Texas Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act.2 The corporation then applied to the Texas 
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state 
to file the certificate of limited partnership.8 Held, a writ of mandamus will 
be granted. A corporation qualified to act as a trustee is authorized to be-
come a limited partner under the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 
Port Arthur Trust Co. v. A.M. Muldrow, (Texas 1956) 291 S.W. (2d) 312. 
In the large majority of states a corporation has no authority to enter 
into partnerships.4 Exceptions to this rule are generally recognized (1) where 
the corporation is expressly authorized by statute or its corporate charter 
to become a partner, (2) where the sole management of the business is 
reserved to the corporation, and (3) where the relationship can be classified 
as a joint adventure.5 Judicial discrimination with respect to corporate 
partners is based primarily on the public policy against allowing the manage-
ment of a corporation to be removed from the hands of the directors.6 This 
policy has continued to be controlling under the Uniform Partnership Act 
even though that act expressly states that a "corporation" is included within 
the definition of persons capable of forming partnerships.7 When con-
sidering the question of whether a corporation can be a partner, the 
approach of the courts has been either to ignore the act8 or to find that it 
is not indicative of a general legislative intent to allow corporations to 
1 Principal case at 313-314. 
2 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1949; Supp. 1956) art. 6132 {a), §2, "a limited partnership 
is a partnership formed by two (2) or more persons ..•. " 
3 Id., §3 (a), "two (2) or more persons desiring to form a limited partnership shall: 
(1) Sign and swear to a certificate, . . • (2) File for record the certificate in the office of 
the Secretary of State •... " 
4 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §87 (1946); 6 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. rev. ed., 
§2520 (1950). 
5 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §87 (1946). 
6 Op. Atty. Gen. (N.Y. 1935) 230 at 231: "The whole policy of the law creating and 
regulating corporations looks to the exclusive management of the affairs of each corpora-
tion by the officers provided for or authorized by its charter.'' See also Mallory v. Hanaur 
Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S.W. 396 (1888). 
7 See, e.g., 1 Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §68.020. The same provision is in force in all 
states which have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act except Massachusetts., 
s The UP A became effective in Oregon on March 31, 1939. Ostlind v. Ostlind Valve, 
178 Ore. 161 at 190, 165 P. (2d) 779 (1946), was the first case in which the corporate 
partner question was considered subsequent to the passing of the act. By way of dictum 
the court said that it was "ultra vires" for a corporation to be a member of a partner-
ship, and did not mention the UPA. 
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become "members" of a partnership.0 Although legal writers have pointed 
out the fallacy in reasoning which prohibits delegation of management 
authority to a partner but allows a corporation to appoint agents which 
may bind it by contract,10 thus far their views have not prevailed. The 
arguments in favor of corporate partners are strengthened by the willing-
ness of the courts to recognize corporate membership in joint adventures, 
which are for most purposes not distinguishable from partnerships.11 It 
has been urged that the real reason why modem courts refuse to permit 
corporations to become partners in the overwhelming weight of authority 
to the contrary, although in practical effect corporations have been allowed 
to enter partnerships under the guise of joint adventures, i.e., the courts 
have utilized a subterfuge to circumvent the prohibition against corporate 
partners.12 Where the nature of the relationship is not so obvious that 
the court is forced to call it a partnership, case authority seems to support 
this analysis.13 There is surprisingly little authority under the Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act on the question _of corporate participation as a 
limited partner. The decision in the principal case appears to be the only 
one to date directly in point. Although the act fails to define expressly 
"person" as including corporations, the rule of construction followed in 
most jurisdictions is that "person" includes artificial persons unless ex-
clusion is required from the context of the statute.14 The ULPA partially 
eliminates elements of the partner relationship which courts have declared 
inconsistent with corporate status. Under the act the corporation is liable 
only to the extent of the assets placed in the limited partnership, and man-
agement and control are delegated only with respect to those assets. In 
effect, a type of limited agency is created. A somewhat analogous relation-
ship often arises in joint adventures, where limitations in the scope and 
lifetime of the enterprise are common.15 This suggests that it might be 
9 See Op. Atty. Gen. (N.Y. 1935) 230. See also Freida Popkov Corp. v. Stack, 198 
Misc. 826, 103 N.Y.S. (2d) 507 (1950). But see Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Pope, 178 
Tenn. 580, 161 S.W. (2d) 211 (1941), affd. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 
649 (1942), which has been cited for the proposition that corporations may enter partner-
ships under the UPA. The court failed to indicate whether it based its decision on 
partnership or joint adventure, but a subsequent decision, Texas Gas Transmission Corp. 
v. Atkins, 197 Tenn. 123, 270 S.W. (2d) 384 (1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 883 (1954), ex-
plained the Memphis case as an application of the joint adventure concept. 
10 See Rowley, "The Corporate Partner," 14 MINN. L. REv. 769 (1930). 
11 See 30 AM. JUR., Joint Adventure §5 (1940). . 
12 See Rowley, "The Corporate Partner," 14 MINN. L. REv. 769 (1930); 46 IIARv. 
L. REv. 519 (1933). 
13 E.g., Clement A. Evans &: Co. v. Waggoner, 197 Ga. 857, 30 S.E. (2d) 915 (1944); 
Luling Oil &: Gas Co. v. Humble Oil &: Refining Co., 144 Tex. 475, 191 S.W. (2d) 716 
(1945); Luhrig Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal &: Dock Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1922) 281 F. 265. 
14 E.g., United States Tire Co. v. Keystone Tire Sales Co., 153 S.C. 56, 150 S.E. 347 
(1929); Fleming v. Texas Loan Agency, 87 Tex. 238, 27 S.W. 126 (1894); Moss v. Standard 
Drug Co., 159 Ohio St. 464, 112 N.E. (2d) 542 (1953). See also 13 AM. JUR., Corporations 
§9 (1938). 
15 E.g., Kasishke v. Baker, (10th Cir. 1945) 146 F. (2d) 113, cert. den. 325 U.S. 856 
(1945); Wiley N. Jackson Co. v. City of Norfolk, 197 Va. 62, 87 S.E. (2d) 781 (1955); 
Nolan v. J. &: M. Doyle Co., 338 Pa. 398, 13 A. (2d) 59 (1940). 
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possible to justify corporate limited partners through an extension of the 
joint adventure rationale. It should be noted, however, that the decision 
in the principal case is the result of unusual circumstances and is based on 
a different line of reasoning. The details of the trust agreements are not 
set out in the opinion, but, assuming that the corporation protected itself 
from liability for delegation of management of the trust funds,16 its entry 
into the limited partnership involved no capital risk. Only trust funds, of 
which the corporation was trustee, were contributed to the limited partner-
ship. These trust funds were not corporate assets, and assets that did be-
long to the corporation were safeguarded by the ULP A. The decision in 
the principal case is easily explained as falling within the reservation of 
management exception to the rule against corporate partners.17 Thus, it 
may be doubted that the principal case will serve as a general precedent 
for recognition of corporate limited partners. The joint adventure analogy 
could be invoked, but the policy considerations against partnership will 
probably be controlling where a substantial contribution of corporation 
assets is involved. Although these considerations are subject to valid 
criticism and should be re-evaluated in terms of logic and modern business 
needs, there is no reason to suspect that the courts will not continue to 
follow them. 
Richard Singer 
16 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §171.1, PP· 1277-1278 (1956): "Sb, io9,_::even though the 
trustee continues to be trustee, it is a breach of trust to commit the 'whdle management 
of the trust estate to another, unless he is permitted to do so by the terms of the trust." 
17 See note 5 supra. A corporation is allowed to enter a partnership where the whole 
management of the enterprise is reserved to the corporation because a relationship of 
this nature is consistent with the policy against delegation of corporate management and 
control over its own assets. It follows that an agreement whereby the corporation con-
tributes none of its own assets to the enterprise and cannot be held liable for the debts 
of the enterprise is also allowable. 
